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ABSTRACT 
Learning in the Context of Math Anxiety
by
Michelle Melissa Guillaume
Dr. Mark H. Ashcraft, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Psychology 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Previous studies have examined the effects of math anxiety on working memory 
and performance. It has been shown that having a high level of math anxiety not only 
decreases performance, but also interferes with working memory such that the anxiety 
competes for working memory resources, decreasing the amount of working memory 
resources available to work on a math task. Previous research has focused on the 
semantic memory approach, i.e., testing people on what they already know. The current 
study took this research one step further and looked at learning, specifically stimulus 
learning, in the context of math anxiety. A well studied lab task, the true/false 
verification task, was adapted to study learning on the part of individuals who vary in 
their math anxiety. Some of the addition problems were shown only once to participants 
while other addition problems were shown nine times. One prediction of this study was 
that low math anxious individuals would be able to learn more mathematical information 
across blocks of trials than high math anxious individuals, and would demonstrate this on 
a recall test of incidental learning after three blocks of making true/false judgments to 
simple addition problems. Although this learning effect between high and low math
111
anxious individuals was not found, another interesting effect was discovered with regard 
to the learning recall task. High math anxious participants learned more of the false 
answers with large splits than the low math anxious participants. This was an unexpected 
finding, and one inference that could be drawn from this is that low math anxious 
participants are not looking at the false problems with the large splits long enough to 
encode them, whereas the high math anxious individuals may be looking at the problem 
longer, unable to quickly judge it as false.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty five years, researchers have become increasingly interested in the 
topic of math anxiety. Math anxiety involves discomfort and nervousness that can result 
from a situation dealing with numbers or a situation involving simple calculations. It can 
be felt in a math classroom, in a restaurant, and even in the comfort o f one’s own home 
while trying to balance a checkbook. Having this specific type of anxiety has been found 
to correlate with students avoiding math classes as well as avoiding careers involving 
math (Hembree, 1990).
Since 2001 several studies have investigated the consequences o f math anxiety as it 
relates to gender (Miller & Bichsel, 2004), education (Chen & Geng, 2002), cognition 
(Ashcraft, 2002), and performance (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). With all of this research that 
has looked at math anxiety and performance and math anxiety and working memory, 
little work has been done to see what effect math anxiety may have on the learning and 
storage of math facts in memory. In this thesis, math anxiety as it relates to the learning 
and storage o f math facts was investigated.
Before discussing the thesis experiment and its results, a detailed review of the 
literature will take a comprehensive look at math cognition to show what has been found 
in terms of how children and adults comprehend numbers as well as the
different strategies they use to tackle different types o f math problems. The review will 
then cover research that has examined the relationship between math cognition and 
working memory. Once an understanding o f the theories and models behind math 
cognition and working memory has been established, the literature review will turn to 
examine the initial research on math anxiety as well as the relationship between math 
anxiety and working memory, the development o f the Math Anxiety Rating Scale, and 
the possible causes and consequences o f having math anxiety. Finally, the experiment 
for this thesis project will be explained, results will be given, and a discussion will follow
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Math Cognition
Some of the first pioneering work involving how both children and adults thought 
about math and exactly how math problems and processes were mentally represented was 
found in the work of Parkman and Groen (1971) and Groen and Parkman (1972). In the 
1971 study, they gave college students a yes/no verification task in which the participants 
looked at simple addition problems of the form a + b = c, where c was a double digit sum, 
and pushed the yes button if the equation was correct and pushed the no button if the 
equation was incorrect. For the incorrect equations, the answers were wrong by not more 
than ±2. Results of the experiment indicated the problem size effect; reaction time 
latencies increased as both a function of minimum addend and sum (Parkman & Groen, 
1971). Reaction time latencies for tie problems (6 +6) were also found to be significantly 
faster than for nontie problems. The authors indicated that adults may be performing 
simple addition problems in the same way that children were, only the process had 
become automated and much faster; however, more reaction time data for children was 
needed before that conclusion could be confirmed (Parkman & Groen, 1971).
In 1972, Groen and Parkman set out to obtain more evidence with regard to children 
performing simple addition. They considered several counting models for first grade 
children who were attempting to solve simple addition problems (problems with single 
digit addends and sums of less than or equal to nine). The five predicted models were 
tested using data obtained with a production task. Participants had a box with the 
numbers one through nine on it. A problem was presented to them, they then had to 
calculate the answer and press the numbered button that corresponded to the correct sum. 
This was in contrast to the verification task used in the 1971 Parkman and Groen 
experiment in which the participant would be shown the problem with an answer, and 
they would simply have to verify whether the answer provided made the equation true or 
false. After testing all five predicted counting models, the results showed that, in the first 
grade, children were using what Groen and Parkman referred to as a “count by min” 
model for solving simple addition problems. According to the “count by min” model, a 
first grader would solve the problem X + Y = ? in the following manner: first, a mental 
counter would be set to the larger of the two addends (max(X,Y)). The child would then 
count up by the minimum addend (min(X,Y)) one step at a time to achieve the answer. 
For example, given a problem such as 5 + 2, the child would hold the larger addend, 5, in 
memory, and then increment by Is until the number of increments equaled the minimum 
addend, 2. One exception found in the study was in the case of tie problems. Tie 
problems all appeared to have the same reaction time latency, and the authors stated that 
children must have been using some type of retrieval system for tie problems, indicating 
that those answers were already stored in memory.
After the conclusion of the study, there were two possible ideas presented about how 
adults might have been processing simple addition problems; one idea was that the 
process for adults would be the same as that for the first graders, only faster (Parkman & 
Groen, 1971). There were some discrepencies between the data, however, that did not fit 
with that idea. Firstly, even though the minimum addend provided the best fit, for the 
adult data, the sum of the problem accounted for almost as much of the variance as the 
minimum addend. Secondly, with adults being extremely faster than children, it did not 
seem that adults were incrementing by counting to themselves, and that meant that if 
adults were incrementing, then they were doing it by some unknown mechanism (Groen 
& Parkman, 1972). Those discrepancies led to a rejection of the idea that the simple 
addition process for adults and children was the same. A second idea was that adults 
would use the same reproductive process that children used for tie problems on most 
simple addition problems; however, for an unknown proportion of simple addition 
problems, adults would revert back to the counting model used by children (Groen & 
Parkman, 1972).
Evidence pointing to a direct retrieval process in adults came from Parkman (1972). 
An experiment was conducted to try and extend the “count-by min” model to 
multiplication. In the experiment, college students were given a verification task in 
which they were given a single-digit multiplication problem with an answer (p x q = r), 
and they had to respond whether the equation presented to them was true or false. The 
latencies increased as a function o f min(p,q) and as a function o f the sum of p and q; that 
result showed the problem size effect. This was the same effect found for simple addition 
in Groen and Parkman, 1972. It seemed that simple addition and multiplication were
governed by the same underlying processes (Parkman, 1972). However, to interpret the 
new findings for multiplication in terms of the “count-by min” model, the participants 
would need to be counting-on as indicated by the larger multiplier; for example, in the 
case of 7 X 3, an individual would count-on by 7s for 3 increments (Ashcraft, 1992). In 
comparing the count-by min model for simple addition to the same model for 
multiplication, it was pointed out that the restriction of incrementing by 1 s for addition 
did not make sense if for multiplication, one could count-on by 7s (Miller, Perlmutter, & 
Keating, 1984). In the discussion section, Parkman (1972) talked about the limitations of 
the “count-by min” model and wrote that if  single-digit multiplication was assumed to be 
achieved through a process of direct retrieval, then single-digit addition would also seem 
to operate under that same process.
In 1978, the ideas given regarding adults’ processing of simple addition problems by 
Groen and Parkman (1972) were tested by Ashcraft and Bataglia in two experiments 
using college students as participants. In the first experiment, simple addition problems 
with answers were presented in a true/false verification task. For the false problems, the 
authors investigated the split effect. Originally, the term split was used to describe the 
distance between two digits presented on a mental number line. If a participant was 
presented with two digits, he/she would use a mental number line to compare the two 
digits and decide which one was larger (e.g. Moyer & Landauer, 1967). For the Ashcraft 
and Bataglia study, the split effect was manipulated in the answers of the false stimuli 
presented such that some of the false answers were different from the real answer by ± lor 
2 (termed reasonable false) and other false answers were different from the real answer 
by ±5 or 6 (termed unreasonable false).
The results o f the first experiment did not lead to evidence o f a strictly counting 
model in adults. Unlike the previous results, which indicated the minimum addend to 
account for most of the variance (Groen & Parkman, 1972), the first experiment found 
that 48% of the variance was accounted for by the square of the correct sum for true and 
reasonable false problems, indicating the problem size effect. Also found was that the 
minimum addend was only the best predictor for unreasonable false problems.
According to these results, a strictly counting model for adults did not make sense 
because the squared term accounting for most of the variance could not be made to 
correspond with a counting factor as proposed in the “count-by min” model (Ashcraft & 
Bataglia, 1978).
To test that result thoroughly, the second experiment in the study used the same 
stimuli as the first experiment with the exception of some repeated stimuli. The authors 
investigated what happened to reaction times when the stimulus was repeated in its 
entirety, when only the sum was repeated, and when either the first or the second addend 
was repeated. Results indicated that the reaction times were significantly decreased when 
the problem was repeated in its entirety, and that even when only the sum was repeated, 
reaction times were facilitated (Ashcraft & Bataglia, 1978). These repetition effects 
provided direct evidence against a strictly counting model for adults in that Groen and 
Parkman’s 1972 “count-by min” model could not explain the facilitation in reaction times 
that occurred when exactly repeated stimuli were presented. A network retrieval model 
was posited in which the network representation for addition was a square with the digits 
0-9 on two adjacent sides and the sums located at the intersection point o f any two 
numbers. Incorporating the exponential problem size effect, modifications to the square
were presented that included stretching out the distance between larger sums or making 
the distance between entry sums larger as the addends got larger (Ashcraft & Bataglia, 
1978).
To examine the various models for mental addition, a study was conducted which 
tested the strictly counting model, the direct access model with backup counting (Groen 
& Parkman, 1972), and the network retrieval model (Ashcraft & Bataglia, 1978) o f adults 
processing of mental addition (Ashcraft & Stazyk, 1981). The results showed that 
reaction times again increased with problem size and also decreased with increased split 
in the false answers. These results were consistent with the network retrieval model 
proposed by Ashcraft and Bataglia, and they did not refute the network representation 
scheme proposed in that study.
By the early 1980s, it had been shown that first graders used a “count by min” model 
(Groen & Parkman, 1972) and that adults were using a network retrieval model (Ashcraft 
& Bataglia, 1978, Ashcraft & Stazyk, 1981). Researchers were beginning to wonder 
exactly where the transition occurred from a counting model in the first grade to a 
retrieval model in adulthood. In 1982, Ashcraft and Fierman conducted a study to try and 
investigate that very question. The experiment consisted of simple addition problems 
presented to third, fourth, and sixth graders for a true/false verification task. Results 
showed that half of the third graders were using a counting process and the other half 
were using retrieval methods indicating that there may be a transition occurring from 
counting to retrieval happening in the third grade. Fourth and sixth graders were found to 
have similar reaction time profiles to adults indicating a retrieval method, and, although 
fourth graders were still slow to judge the false problems, sixth graders were found to
perform the same as adults. Analyses showed a switch from the minimum addend being 
the best predictor to the correct sum squared being the best predictor starting in the third 
grade and the correct sum squared being the best predictor from then on.
Another interesting finding arose when the math textbooks of elementary schools 
were examined to see what kinds of simple addition problems were shown most 
frequently. The results showed that small problems were presented much more 
frequently than large problems (Hamarm & Ashcraft, 1986). This result gave evidence in 
favor of the network representation scheme presented by Ashcraft and Bataglia in 1978. 
Small problems had stronger network representations due to experience and lots of 
practice, resulting in shorter reaction times. Also, longer reaction times, indicating 
weaker network representations for large problems, could be explained by a lack of 
experience and practice beginning from the initial learning of simple addition.
As more researchers became interested in math cognition and the mental processes 
involved in performing math tasks, more evidence was found confirming repetition 
effects (LeFevre, Bisanz, & Mrkonjic, 1988). Also, evidence was found that challenged 
a strictly retrieval model for adults’ processing of simple addition problems (LeFevre, 
Sadesky, & Bisanz 1996). Lefevre et al. found that the strategies used by adults 
depended on the characteristics o f the task. In fact, it was found that the size of the 
problem affected exactly which strategies adults would choose to use (LeFevre et al., 
1996). As the problems got larger (having a sum greater than 10), adults were just as 
likely to use a procedural strategy as a retrieval strategy. Reaction time data obtained by 
Lefevre et al. (1996) showed slower reaction times when participants reported using 
procedural strategies and faster reaction times when participants used retrieval strategies.
Another result showed that if  the minimum addend was 1,2, or 3, the participant was 
most likely to report using a counting strategy.
In 2001, Kirk and Ashcraft performed two experiments to further investigate the 
results obtained by Lefevre et al. (1996). The first experiment replicated the conditions 
in Lefevre et al. (1996) with the addition of two contrasting instruction conditions and a 
silent control condition. Instruction conditions consisted o f four groups: retrieval bias, 
strategy bias, replication, and silent control. The results showed a verbal report bias 
based on which instructions the participant received; those participants who had been 
biased to report direct retrieval strategies did so 90% of the time, and those participants 
who were biased toward non-retrieval strategies showed a higher increase in reporting 
non-retrieval strategies in their verbal reports as well. The second experiment replicated 
the first with the exception of using multiplication problems instead of addition problems; 
all instructions were also changed to accommodate multiplication. Once again, the 
results showed that participants’ verbal reports were biased when given demand 
instructions. Overall, demand instructions were shown to play an important role in 
participants’ verbal reports which was not an accurate reflection of their cognitive 
processes (Kirk & Ashcraft, 2001).
Summary o f  Math Cognition Research
So it has been shown that children in the first grade use a “count by min” model 
(Groen & Parkman, 1972); however, a transition occurs somewhere in the third grade 
where children are switching from the “count by min” model to a retrieval model for 
simple addition (Ashcraft & Fierman, 1982). Different results have been obtained with 
regard to the performance on simple addition problems by adults. One result indicated
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that adults used various strategies as a function of problem size (LeFevre et.al, 1996). 
Other results pointed to adults using a strietly retrieval model to perform simple addition 
tasks (Asheraft & Bataglia, 1978, Asheraft & Stazyk, 1981).
Sinee the evidence points to frequent, but not continuous use o f a direct retrieval 
strategy, it would be good to examine why adults may be choosing procedural strategies 
or why some adults may just be taking longer to retrieve the solution. One explanation 
ean be found by looking at math cognition through a model for working memory. The 
next section will give an explanation of the working memory model for which the 
framework of the eurrent study is based. Researeh examining the relationship between 
math cognition and working memory will also be discussed.
Math Cognition and Working Memory
Working memory involves the temporary storage and proeessing o f information. 
Cognitive psychologists looking at working memory typically look at it in terms of 
Baddeley’s (1986) working memory model. There are three parts to the working memory 
model: the eentral exeeutive and two storage systems (the visuospatial sketchpad and 
phonological loop). The central exeeutive acts as the supervisory system; it initiates 
retrieval from long term memory and controls the information going to and from the 
visuospatial sketchpad and the phonological loop. The phonological loop deals mainly 
with auditory verbal information such as remembering somebody’s name that you just 
met, and the visuospatial sketchpad is involved with visual and spatial information such 
as how fast an object is moving or where it is located. Recently, Baddeley (2000) has 
added a fourth component to the model, called the 'episodic buffer'. This component is a
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third storage system, dedicated to linking information across domains to form integrated 
units of visual, spatial, and verbal information.
According to Baddeley’s working memory model, working memory only has a 
limited number of resources to work with at any one time, allowing only a certain number 
of tasks to be done at the same time. Sometimes more than one task can be accomplished 
at the same time; however, it depends on which subsystems of the central executive are 
involved and if there is competition for any of the working memory resources. It is easier 
to do two tasks, each relying on a different subsystem of the central executive (i.e. a 
verbal and a spatial task), than it is to do two tasks in which each task is relying on the 
same subsystem (i.e. two spatial tasks) (Baddeley & Hitch, 1974).
By the early 1990s, questions were being asked as to the involvement of working 
memory in the process o f solving arithmetic problems. One experiment aimed at 
investigating the role o f working memory in addition was conducted by Ashcraft,
Donley, and Halas (1992). The authors used both single digit and two column addition 
problems for a true/false verification task. Three concurrent tasks (repeat, 
alphabetization, and word generation) were also presented to each participant. For the 
single digit addition problems, it was found in the word generation and the 
alphabetization tasks that the participants exhibited slower verbal performance, which 
implicated working memory in the process o f simple addition. The two column addition 
problems showed an even stronger reliance on working memory; the interference of the 
concurrent task was evident, especially when the carry operation was required (Ashcraft 
et al., 1992). Although working memory was shown to be involved in both single and
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two column addition problems, specific subsystems of the working memory model (the 
central executive, phonological loop, and visuo-spatial sketchpad) were not discussed.
Several studies provided evidence that the central executive is involved in solving 
single-digit arithmetic problems. In 1996, a study was done with the intention of finding 
out which parts o f the working memory system were active when adults performed 
simple addition problems. Lemaire, Abdi, and Fayol used college students in their 
experiment and gave them simple addition and multiplication problems in a true/false 
verification task. For a subset of the false problems, confusion problems were presented; 
confusion problems were considered those problems in which the proposed answer 
matched a correct answer to another problem or was correct under another operation (i.e. 
3 + 4 -  12 or 3 X 4 -  7). Another subset of false problems did not contain confusion 
problems. The authors did not manipulate split for the experiment, and easy and difficult 
problems were determined using a difficulty rating scale (Ashcraft’s index; see Hamann 
& Ashcraft, 1985). One of four memory load conditions was assigned to participants: 
control, articulatory suppression, canonical letters, and random letters. In the articulatory 
suppression condition, participants were asked to repeat a word over and over to try and 
interfere with the phonological loop. The canonical letter condition involved the 
participants repeating the letters “abcdef ’ over and over. Finally, in the random letter 
condition, participants had to constantly repeat a random combination of the letters 
“abcdef.” Results showed longer latencies between easy and difficult problems in the 
random letter condition as well as higher error rates for confusion vs. nonconfusion 
problems in the random letter condition (Lemaire et.al, 1996). These findings from their
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first experiment led the authors to conclude that the central executive was indeed 
involved in adult’s solving of mental arithmetic problems.
In their second experiment, Lemaire et.al (1996) replicated the first experiment with 
the exception o f showing participants either addition problems or multiplication 
problems, but not both. Also, partieipants were randomly assigned to an operation by 
load condition. Operations consisted of addition or multiplication and loads consisted of 
artieulatory suppression, canonical letters, or random letters. Results were consistent 
with the first experiment and indieated that an overload o f one slave system, the 
phonologieal loop, implicated the eentral exeeutive as being involved in the proeess of 
mental arithmetic in adults. One weakness o f the experiment was that the role o f the 
phonological loop itself in mental arithmetic was not discussed; only its implications with 
regard to the eentral executive were mentioned.
In 2001, De Rammelaere, Stuyven, and Vandierendonek attempted to investigate the 
exact role, if  any, that the phonologieal loop was playing with regard to adult’s 
processing of mental arithmetie problems. Experiment one eonsisted o f only simple 
addition problems presented for true/false verifieation, and the split effeet was also 
examined with reference to small splits (±1) and large splits (±9) (De Rammelaere, 
Stuyven, & Vandierendonek, 2001). There were three load conditions; A control 
condition, an articulatory suppression eondition in which the partieipant had to repeat a 
word over and over (designed to overload the phonologieal loop), and a random time 
interval rhythm generation eondition (designed to overload the central exeeutive).
Results indicated that the phonologieal loop was not involved beeause the articulatory 
suppression task did not interfere with the verification task; however, the rhythm
14
generation task did interfere with the verification task which confirmed that the central 
executive was highly involved in adult’s processing of mental addition problems (De 
Rammelaere et.al, 2001). Their second experiment resulted in the same conclusions for 
simple multiplication problems. Although it showed that the central executive had a 
general effect on processing, it was not clear which aspects in particular were important 
to arithmetic.
Summary
After several studies, it was clear that the central executive was involved in arithmetic 
processes. Evidence also suggested that the phonological loop was not involved in 
solving arithmetic problems. As this work was being completed, a new area of research 
was being looked into involving math anxiety. The next section will introduce the math 
anxiety rating scale as well as discuss some previous research and findings in the area of 
math anxiety.
Math Anxiety and the Math Anxiety Rating Scale 
As mentioned in the introduction, math anxiety involves discomfort and nervousness 
that can result from a situation dealing with numbers or a situation involving simple 
calculations. In 1972, Richardson and Suinn developed a scale with which to measure an 
individual’s level of math anxiety. Named the Math Anxiety Rating Scale (MARS), the 
scale contained 98 items, each describing a situation dealing with math. Some situations 
were academically oriented (e.g. taking a math test) while others referred to situations 
encountered in everyday life (e.g. making change). Using a five point Likert scale, 
participants rated the level of anxiety that they would feel in those situations.
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Due to the length of the scale and the time that it took participants to complete it, a 
shortened version o f the MARS was developed that consisted of 25 items (Alexander & 
Martray, 1989). To make sure that the newly shortened version was representative o f the 
98-item original, an experiment was conducted which found the 25-item scale to be 
highly correlated (r = .96) with the original 98-item MARS (Fleck et. al, 1998). The 
sMARS, as Fleck et. al (1998) termed the 25-item scale, is now the most widely used 
scale to measure math anxiety.
Math Anxiety Research 
Math anxiety researchers have looked at achievement tests to examine how math anxiety 
affects performance on math tasks. One such math achievement test used in math 
anxiety experiments is the Wide Range Achievement Test (WRAT), which was 
developed by Jastak and Jastak (1978). For the first three lines of the WRAT, which 
consist of whole number simple addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division 
problems, Ashcraft and Kirk (1998) found that low, medium, and high math anxiety 
groups performed equivalently. This indicated that all participants, regardless of math 
anxiety level, had the same level o f achievement when performing simple mathematical 
procedures. However, group differences did begin to appear on lines 5 and 6 where the 
problems consisted o f fractions, decimal arithmetic, and long division with a remainder. 
The largest group differences were seen on the last line, consisting o f functions and 
factoring procedures, where low math anxious participants averaged 1.9 correct out of 5, 
versus 0.5 correct out o f 5 for high math anxious participants (Ashcraft & Kirk, 1998).
Another study done in 1994 by Ashcraft and Faust investigated what level of math
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tasks was needed to start to seeing math anxiety interfere with computation of the math 
task. The results indicated that two-column addition problems involving carrying were 
sufficient to have math anxiety effects. The high math anxious groups had much slower 
reaction times to computing carry problems than the low math anxious group, indicating 
that the math anxiety experienced by the high math anxious groups was interfering with 
their ability to do the computation involved in a carrying problem. This result was the 
first o f its kind to be reported in the literature (Faust, Ashcraft, & Fleck, 1996).
A disturbing finding by Faust et al., (1996) was that individuals with high math anxiety 
experienced what the authors termed to be a speed-accuracy trade-off. According to the 
authors, the high math anxious participants exhibited faster reaction times than the 
medium math anxious participants; however, the accuracy of the high math anxious 
participants was dismal compared to the medium math anxious participants. They 
concluded that, to get through the discomfort of completing the math task, the high math 
anxious individuals were hurrying through the problems in an attempt to relieve their 
anxiety, allowing their accuracy to diminish along the way.
After seeing some o f the findings regarding math anxiety, it was logical to follow in the 
footsteps o f the math cognition research and examine what, if  any, effects math anxiety 
was having on working memory. Research examining the relationship between math 
anxiety and working memory is covered in the next section.
Math Anxiety and Working Memory 
As illustrated by Eysenck (1992), general anxiety interferes with working memory 
resources and this is reflected in the slow and/or inaccurate performance of a task. By
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that time, several researehers were already studying math anxiety; however, Eysenek 
gave them a new perspeetive about what might be going on with individuals who 
experienee math anxiety. Later, researehers applied Eysenek’s (1992) idea to math and 
discovered that anxiety and the math task were both competing for the same pool of 
working memory resources. From there, a pool of research developed examining exactly 
how the math anxiety was interfering with working memory and specifically which kinds 
of tasks caused the interference to be present.
Math anxiety can be understood in the context o f Baddeley’s (1986) working memory 
model. The math task being done is taking up working memory resources, and the 
anxiety associated with the math task is also taking up working memory resources. In 
other words, the anxiety is competing with the math task for the available working 
memory resources. Eysenek (1992) found that the higher the level of general anxiety, the 
less people were able to perform a second task requiring working memory resources. 
From that result it was deduced that the higher the level o f math anxiety, the more 
resources will be needed from working memory, leaving little or no resources left to 
solve the math task presented. With these ideas in mind, several research studies 
investigated the relationship between math anxiety and working memory.
In 1998, Hopko, Ashcraft, and Gute, conducted an experiment in which a reading task 
was used to examine whether math anxiety would disrupt normal processing with regard 
to the working memory system. Participants were assessed using the sMARS, and they 
were then categorized as low, medium, or high math anxious. They were then randomly 
assigned to one o f three reading conditions consisting of either math or non-math 
paragraphs as well as different distraeter types: control, unrelated (distraeter words that
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were unrelated to paragraph content), and related (distraeter words that were related to 
paragraph content). Results showed that high and medium math anxious participants had 
much slower reading times when there were distracters present than the low math anxious 
participants. The high math anxious participants also made more errors on the 
comprehension questions than did the low math anxious participants (Hopko et.al, 1998). 
Although it was shown that high math anxious individuals performed poorly in 
comparison to low math anxious individuals, it was not clear whether this was due to the 
math anxiety specifically or to inefficiency in inhibiting attention based on the thoughts 
provoked by other factors such as distractibility.
To examine if indeed math anxiety consumed working memory resources, Ashcraft and 
Kirk (2001) introduced a dual task paradigm in their experiment. If math anxiety and 
performance o f the math task were competing for working memory resources, the dual 
task paradigm would be sure to show it. The authors’ prediction was that there would be 
a competition for working memory resources, and, in fact, that is what was found; those 
participants with the highest levels o f math anxiety had the poorest performance on the 
math task. This was especially the case on carry problems, those previously shown to 
rely heavily on working memory. Therefore, it seems that math anxiety can consume 
working memory resources.
Current experiment
Previous literature has mainly focused on a “declarative memory” approach (testing 
participants on what they already know) to the study of math anxiety. The literature has 
not yet examined learning in the context of math anxiety, which seems odd, given that, in
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general we believe that math anxious individuals learn less math in school. This 
inference is drawn from evidence concerning math achievement tests; math anxious 
individuals tend to score lower on these tests than non-math anxious individuals. As an 
initial attempt to examine learning in the context of math anxiety, the standard true/false 
verification task was used with college students, where the construction o f the stimulus 
set provided differential opportunities for learning to take place. In particular, one set of 
stimuli was repeated nine times throughout the experiment, providing multiple 
opportunities for learning, whereas the other set of stimuli was only shown once. 
Because adults already know the answers to simple addition facts, the learning being 
examined here involved “stimulus learning,” in other words, learning that, for example, 
the incorrect answer 17 appeared with the problem 7 + 8. Collecting RT and error data 
across three blocks o f trials afforded a substantial body o f data with which to address 
issues related to learning on the part of low vs. high math anxious participants; (e.g., 
examination of performance improvement across practice for repeated vs. non-repeated 
problems as a function of math anxiety and split). Beyond this, participants in the 
intentional learning condition were told at the outset that they would be asked to recall 
the answers they saw during the experimental trials, so they were expected to attempt to 
encode and remember these numbers. They were predicted to be more accurate in doing 
so for answers that repeat nine times. Comparing performance, both in the timed 
experimental trials and on the memory task as a function o f math anxiety, problem size, 
split, and working memory, provided new insights into the role of math anxiety as 
individuals perform a demanding and memory-dependent mathematical cognition task.
2 0
The current study was aimed at examining math anxiety and its effects on the storage 
of arithmetic information. These effects were investigated in terms of how well 
participants would be able to remember information about simple addition problems, 
depending on their level of math anxiety. Problems were presented for true/false 
verification, with half of the problems presented with a correct answer of true and half 
with a false answer. In past research (e.g. Ashcraft & Bataglia, 1978), false problems 
have been categorized as being reasonable false or unreasonable false problems. For the 
1978 study, Ashcraft and Bataglia used splits of ±1 or 2 for reasonable false problems, 
and ±5 or 6 to designate unreasonable false problems. Reaction times were found to be 
faster for unreasonable false problems. When participants saw a false problem, they may 
or may not have remembered the wrong answer that was paired with the problem. 
Whether or not they remembered may have been due to the size of the split and/or the 
level of math anxiety. The current experiment utilized three levels of split, ±1 or 2, ±5 or 
6, and ±8 or 9, small, medium, and large, respectively.
Consistent with previous findings, one prediction was that, demographieally, high 
math anxious individuals would have taken less high school and college math courses 
and received lower grades in them on average than the low math anxious individuals.
Another result expected to be consistent with the literature was that high math 
anxious participants with high working memory capacity would still be less accurate than 
the low math anxious participants due to the math anxiety competing for working 
memory resources needed to complete the task.
A final prediction was that participants in the intentional learning condition would 
outperform those in the incidental learning condition on the memory task, regardless of
2 1
math anxiety. The effects of repetition on stimulus learning might have revealed the 
effects of math anxiety in the incidental learning condition such that low math anxious 
participants may have shown superior memory for the answers because their working 
memory was less burdened during math performance, hence their free working memory 
resources would be better able to encode this information. Along the same lines, high 
math anxious participants would have fewer working memory resources available during 
processing, so would be expected to encode and remember less o f the information about 
the false answers. It was possible, however, that a result in the opposite direction might 
be obtained. That is, high math anxious individuals may have actually spent additional 
time in processing false problems, especially those with large splits; after all, Faust et al. 
(1996) found high math anxious individuals to make more errors, rather than fewer, when 
addition problems had larger splits. Thus, paradoxically, because of additional 
processing time, high math anxious participants might have actually demonstrated better 
memory for the false answers with large splits, due to longer exposure to those answers.
Overall the results were predicted to show that not only was the high math anxiety 
interfering with the processes of working memory and the ability to perform simple 
calculations, but that it was also interfering with the learning of basic math fact.
2 2
CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Participants
Participants were recruited from the UNLV subject pool. 73 students participated in 
the experiment to receive course credit.
Materials
Demographic information was collected from all participants using a computer-based 
survey. Basic demographic information such as age, ethnicity, and year in school was 
obtained, and there was also information obtained that was specific to this experiment. 
This information included the number of high school math courses taken, the average 
grade they received in their high school math courses, the average grade they received in 
their college math courses, how much they enjoyed math, and how math anxious they 
considered themselves to be. There was also a checklist on the sheet so they could check 
all of the types o f math classes that they had taken either in high school or while 
attending UNLV.
Short Mathematics Anxiety Rating Scale (sMARS). The sMARS was 
administered to all participants to determine their individual level o f math anxiety. It is a 
25-item questionnaire containing items that ask about specific math situations
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encountered in the classroom (taking a pop quiz) as well as those math situations 
encountered in everyday life (calculating a tip in a restaurant). The questionnaire was 
completed on the computer. Previous research has found the grand mean on the sMARS 
to be 36 with a standard deviation of 16 (Ashcraft, et al., 2007).
Operation Span (OSPAN): Self-Paced. This task was based off of the original 
OSPAN task designed by Turner and Engle in 1989. The self paced version of the 
OSPAN was used in the current experiment to give an estimate of participants’ working 
memory spans. The OSPAN required the participant to read math equations and then 
verify whether or not the answer presented was true or false; the equation remained on 
the screen until the participant pressed one of the required mouse buttons. After each 
equation, a word was presented on the screen for 250ms (different words will follow each 
equation). Following anywhere from two to six equation-word combinations, the 
participant was asked to type in the words that were presented to them in the same order 
that they saw them; a text box appeared on the screen for the participants to type in the 
words. The task was completed on the computer; the participants used the mouse to 
verify the equations as true or false, pressing the left mouse button for true and the right 
mouse button for false, and the keyboard to type in the words. The task was completed 
once the participant was given three trials of each set size two through six, regardless of 
accuracy on the equation verification or word lists. There were two practice trials for the 
participants to get accustomed to the task.
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Experimental Stimuli 
The experimental stimuli consisted of three blocks with 48 problems in each block. 
The stimuli were constructed from the 56 possible nontie, pairwise combinations of the 
integers 2-9. One and zero were not used as addends because it is generally conceded in 
the literature that participants tend to use rules instead of direct retrieval for problems 
involving one and zero addends. The frequency and placement of all integers was 
random. Exact repetition of a problem across trials was permitted in the sense that the 
same problem could have been randomly selected two times in a row from the stimuli 
since 12 o f the stimuli repeated 3 times throughout the set. This was not deemed to pose 
a problem because the answers to the basic facts are already assumed to be stored in long 
term memory. The literature has demonstrated that retrieval of answers to these problems 
is done based on a network retrieval model; therefore, although repetition priming was 
expected to create a faster reaction time, the difference was not expected to be significant.
Procedure
Upon arrival to the laboratory, the participant completed a consent form, the 
demographic survey, and the sMARS. The experimenter went through the instructions 
thoroughly and ran the participants through the OSPAN on the computer. The participant 
was randomly pre-assigned to either an incidental or an intentional learning condition. 
Instructions were given to the participants, explaining to them the task they were about to 
perform and how to use the equipment provided to complete the task. Participants 
assigned to the intentional learning condition were also told at this time that there would 
be a later task in which they would be tested on how many answers they could remember
25
from the problems given during the task. All participants were then given a practice 
block and three experimental blocks o f simple addition problems. The practice block 
contained 8 trials to get the participant accustomed to using the mouse for verification; 
the left button was pushed for true and the right button for false. Each experimental 
block contained 48 problems, with answers, and the participants had to answer true/false 
by depressing one of two buttons on the mouse to indicate their response. Half of the 
problems per experimental block were true and half false, 24 problems each. As far as 
problem size was concerned, addition problems with a sum of 10 or less were considered 
small and those with a sum of more than 10 were considered large. There were 24 large 
and 24 small problems per experimental block of trials. The problems were also evenly 
divided among split so that small, medium, and large splits were represented by 16 
problems each per block of trials. Small splits for this experiment were ±1, ±2 away 
from the correct sum, medium splits were ±5, ±6 away from the correct sum, and large 
splits were ±8, ±9 away from the correct sum. Also, half of the problems per block, 12 
problems, repeated three times each through all three experimental blocks, so over the 
three experimental blocks, the participant saw some problems only once and some 
problems nine times. After completion of the last experimental block of trials, a 
prompted recall test was given to the participants. The prompted recall test was also 
administered on the computer. A problem stem, with a blank space following the equals 
sign, was presented on the screen along with a text box for participants to enter their 
responses. Participants were asked to try and recall the false answer that was presented 
with the problem during the experiment.
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Statistical Analyses
For all problems, a 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  analysis of variance was conducted using 
SPSS software. Factors examined included math anxiety, split, problem size, incidental 
vs. intentional learning, true/false, and repeat/no repeat, respectively. Math anxiety and 
incidental vs. intentional were between subjects variables and the rest were within 
subjects variables. Three dependent variables were analyzed: errors, reaction times, and 
stimulus learning, which was calculated based on the number o f false answers correctly 
recalled on the prompted recall test.
Error rates o f 15% or higher indicated an unusual amount of incorrect answers to 
problems, which could mean that the participants ignored the purpose of the experiment 
and simply tried to get through as fast as they could or that the participant was 
exceptionally below average in terms of arithmetic ability. Because of this, it was 
decided that participants not achieving an accuracy rate of at least 85% on the 
experimental task would not be included in the data analyses for the study. Error rates 
were examined to see if any of the participants were not able to meet the accuracy 
criteria; all participants in the study did achieve at least 85% accuracy for the problems in 
the experimental task. Therefore, no participants were excluded from the analyses for not 
meeting the above criteria.
Also examined were math anxiety level, working memory capacity, and how those 
two related to error rates for false problems. Descriptive statistics and Chi-square were 
used to review demographics to look at the number of math classes taken and grades 
received along with self-reports o f math anxiety and math enjoyment and how those 
related to the level o f math anxiety that the participant exhibited.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The major design used in this experiment was a repeated measures mixed model 
factorial. Within subjects factors included block, split, problem size, repeat, and 
true/false while between subjects factors consisted o f math anxiety, memory span group, 
and learning eondition. A short description of three o f the above variables will be given 
to maintain elarity with respect to the design.
Participants were randomly assigned to either o f two learning conditions. One was an 
intentional learning eondition; for this condition, the experimenter stressed to the 
participants that there would be a recall task following the experimental task, and that 
they would be asked to recall answers that had been presented with the problems when 
they saw them. The second learning condition was an incidental learning eondition in 
which the participant was told nothing regarding the recall task before beginning the 
experimental trials. For the recall task, participants were shown a problem stem and 
required to supply the false answer that was displayed with that stem when they saw it 
during the experiment; answers to true problems were not requested since these could be 
answered based on the participants’ knowledge of arithmetic.
The repeat factor consisted o f a manipulation o f problem repetition throughout the 
three blocks. The participants saw each of twelve problems repeat three times per
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block. Thus, after three blocks of trials, participants saw those twelve repeated problems 
a total of nine times. Participants were also presented in each block with twelve 
problems that were unique, that is, problems that appeared only one time. Participants 
saw unique problems only once throughout the three blocks of trials versus nine times 
each for repeated problems.
For the factor split, which only pertained to the false stimuli, there were three 
different categories: problems with answers that differed from the true answer by ±1 or 
2(small splits), ±5 or 6(medium splits), and ±8 or 9(large splits). In each o f three blocks, 
there were forty-eight trials. In a forty-eight trial block, the participants saw six repeated 
false problems and six unique false problems, with two false problems in each group 
having small, medium, or large splits.
Results on the demographic characteristics will be given in this section as well as a 
discussion of reaction time and error rate data for both the true and false problems in the 
experiment. Concerning error rate data, working memory span results will be discussed 
in relation to error rates on false problems, and finally, recall performance of the 
participants will be discussed.
Demographics
Seventy-three undergraduate students (age range: 18-67, with a mean of 20.91) 
consented to participate in the experiment for course credit. Nine participants did not 
follow instructions on the recall task. The recall task was forced, i.e. they were required 
to provide an answer for the problem stem presented regardless of whether they thought 
they knew the answer; however, nine participants left several answers blank or indicated
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“don’t know” for the answer. Data for those nine participants was excluded from 
analysis, leaving sixty-four subjeets whose data were included in the analyses. Means for 
several demographic variables are displayed in Table 1. Twenty six men and thirty eight 
women were randomly assigned to either the intentional or incidental learning eondition. 
Participants were grouped by their sMARS scores into math anxiety groups; however, 
this was not done in the usual way. In the past, participants were eliminated if they did 
not clearly fall into one o f the three math anxiety groups i.e. elimination occurred if 
partieipants fell within one standard deviation above or below the sMARS mean of 36. 
After examining the demographic data for the eurrent study, it was found that 6 
participants fell within one standard deviation below the mean and 6 partieipants fell 
within one standard deviation above the mean. Not only that, but the math anxiety 
groups were fairly uneven in terms of sample size (low math anxiety n = 13, medium 
math anxiety n = 23, and high math anxiety n = 16). Therefore, the 6 participants below 
the mean were put into the low math anxiety group and the 6 partieipants above the mean 
were put into the high math group, ereating the following: low math anxiety n = 19, 
medium math anxiety n = 23, and high math anxiety n = 22. In order to make sure the 
groups were still signifieantly separated aeeording to their sMARS seores, a one-way 
ANOVA was conducted F(2, 64) -  \ 6 5 . 1 \ % p -  .000.
In terms of math anxiety, the pereentage o f participants did not differ by gender,
X^(2,n = 64) = 3.382,/? = .184nor by ethnie group, %^(10,M = 64) = 11.586,/? = .314. 
Self-report ratings o f both math anxiety and math enjoyment were found to be signifieant 
among math anxiety groups F(2, 61) = 7.613 p  = .001, tjp  ̂= .200 and F(2, 61) = 5.895 p 
= .005, rjp̂  = .162, respeetively. High math anxious partieipants self-reported having
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higher math anxiety and lower math enjoyment, and the opposite pattern was found for 
low math anxious participants. The only significant result regarding gender was found 
with regard to self reports of math anxiety F(l, 62) = 5.143 p  = .027, rjp̂  = .077, with 
women self-reporting being more math anxious than men.
Participants did not differ significantly with respect to high school math grades, 
regardless of math anxiety group F(2, 60) = 2.306 /? = .108 pp ;̂ however for the 
participants that reported an average grade for their college math courses (n = 34), results 
yielded significantly lower grades being reported for participants with high levels of math 
anxiety compared to participants with low levels of math anxiety F(2, 31) = 4.074 p  -  
.027, pp  ̂= .208. This difference may be due to high school math standards being less 
stringent than college math standards. As a result students might have an easier time 
achieving higher grades in high school, regardless of their math anxiety level.
Reaction Time Data (Experimental Task)
A 3 x 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2  repeated measures ANOVA was used for both reaction 
time data and error rate data. Within subjects factors consisted o f block, split, problem 
size, repeat, and true/false while between subjects factors consisted of math anxiety, and 
learning condition.
Outliers were defined as reaction times that fell more than two and a half standard 
deviations above or below the mean. None of the reaction time data fit the criteria of 
being an outlier. This was probably due to the simplicity of the arithmetic stimuli; 
therefore, no reaction times were removed, and no methods of outlier replacement were 
used.
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True and False Problem Commonalities
For both true and false problems there was a significant main effect of learning 
condition (true, F (l, 58) = 18.937 p  = .000, pp  ̂= .246; false, F (l, 58) = 18.406 p  = .000, 
Pp̂  = .241) on reaction times. Participants in the intentional learning condition took an 
average of over 600 ms longer to verify the problem as true or false than participants in 
the incidental learning condition. One way to explain this difference is by looking at the 
difference in the instructions given to participants in the intentional learning condition. It 
was heavily stressed to the participants in the intentional learning condition that there 
would be a recall task following the verification task, and that they would need to 
remember some of the answers that were presented with the problems that they were 
about to see. With that in mind, the significant difference in reaction times between 
learning conditions can be accounted for.
With regard to the within subjects variables, there were significant main effects for 
block and problem size and several interaction effects. As expected, there was a 
significant speed-up in reaction times across blocks (true, F(2, 116) = 76.761 p  = .000,
Pp̂  = .570; false, F(2, 116) = 62.831 p  = .000, pp  ̂= .520). Significant reaction time 
differences were also found with regard to problem size (true, F (l, 58) = 134.111 p  = 
.000, pp  ̂= .698; false, F (l, 58) = 50.479p  = .000, pp  ̂= .465) in that large problems took 
an average o f over 500 ms longer to verify than small problems. The problem size effect 
has been explained in terms of a counting model (Groen & Parkman, 1972), a network 
retrieval model (Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978), and also by a possible lack of experience 
with large problems from a very early grade level (Hamann & Ashcraft, 1986). For a
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thorough review of the literature on the problem size effect see Zhrodoff & Logan 
(2005y
Several significant interaction effects for reaction times were found to be consistent 
between true and false problems. There was a significant hlock x learning condition 
interaction (true, F(2, 116) = 4.937p  -  .009, Pp̂  = .078; false, F(2, 116)= 12.250 p  = 
.000, Pp̂  = .174) such that participants sped up across blocks independent o f learning 
condition; however, participants in the intentional condition were slower overall than 
participants in the incidental learning condition, especially in block 1. This interaction is 
illustrated in figures 1 & 2.
A significant block x problem size interaction was also found for both true and false 
problems (true, F(2, 116) = 15.105 p  = .000, pp  ̂= .207; false, F(2, 116) = 4.739/? = .011, 
Pp̂  = .076). There was a general decrease in reaction times across blocks; however, large 
problems took significantly longer across all three blocks. In block one, participants took 
an average of 700 ms longer to verify large problems than small problems; however, by 
block three, this average went down so that participants were only taking an average of 
300 ms longer to verify large problems than small problems. This interaction provides 
further illustration o f the problem size effect as well as practice and priming effects that 
have heen found throughout the literature (Ashcraft & Bataglia, 1978; Ashcraft & Stazyk, 
1981).
Although there was no main effect for math anxiety, both true and false problems 
showed a significant or nearly significant problem size x math anxiety interaction (true, 
F(2, 58) = 3.041 p  =  .055, Pp̂  = .095; false, F(2, 58) = 3.430p  = .039, Pp̂  = .106). In 
figures 3 & 4, the medium and high math anxious groups showed the general pattern of
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slower reaction times for larger problems; however, both groups were significantly 
slower than the low math anxious group for both small and large problems. Even though 
the high math anxious group was slower than the medium math anxious group overall, 
the difference was not significant, and the two groups really appeared to cluster together 
and separate from the low anxiety group. This is something to consider in terms of how 
math anxiety groups are determined, and will be examined further in the discussion 
section.
True Problems
One interaction effect that was not found with false problems regarding reaction time was 
that even though there was no main effect o f repeat, there was a significant block x repeat 
interaction F(2, 116) = 12.127/? = .000, Pp̂  = .173. As figure 5 illustrates, repeated 
problems sped up across blocks faster than no-repeat problems. This was also not 
surprising because as participants were going through the verification task, they saw the 
same repeated problems three times in each block. By the end o f the third block, 
participants had seen repeated problems nine times.
False Problems
The false problems contained the extra factor of split, which resulted in several 
significant interaction effects that differed from the true problems. There were 
significant effects of split F(2, 116) = 23.563 p  = .000, pp  ̂= .289 and repeat F(l, 58) =
31.103 p  = .000, pp  ̂= .349. Displayed in figure 6 are the average reaction times per split 
group. Reaction time was the slowest for splits o f ±1,2 , continuously sped up through 
splits of ±5, 6, and reached the fastest verification times for splits o f ±8, 9. False 
problems were harder to verify as false when the answer given differed by a small
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amount. This result is consistent with past literature (e.g., Ashcraft & Bataglia, 1978, 
Ashcraft & Stazyk, 1981). It seems that when the false answer is close to the true 
answer, more second-guessing takes place whereas when the answer provided is very 
different from the true answer, it is easier to disregard it as false. Ashcraft and Stazyk 
(1981) discussed this in terms of a “ballpark” decision process i.e. if  the split is large, the 
value is so unreasonable, so “out of the ballpark,” that participants can reject the problem 
quickly, an explanation that seems to capture the pattern shown here.
Error Rate Data (Experimental Task)
For this experiment, an error was considered to be incorrectly verifying either a false 
problem as true or a true problem as false during the experimental trials. Error rates were 
computed for each participant in each condition.
True Problems
There was only one significant finding with regard to true problems and error rates, and 
that was a significant main effect of problem size F(l, 58) = 8.854 p  = .004, pp  ̂= .132. 
On average, participants made 2% errors on small problems and 4% errors on large 
problems. This finding is once again consistent with the problem size effect observed in 
the literature as well as a possible lower degree of practice with large problems overall. 
None of the other within subjects factors or interactions were significant and neither of 
the between subjects factors, learning condition or math anxiety, approached significance 
F(l, 58) = .004 p  = .949, F(2, 58) = .203 p  = .817, respectively.
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False Problems
False problems provided several signifieant effects worth noting. There were found to be 
significant main effects for problem size, split, and repeat; F (l, 58) = 8.178/? = .006, r\^
= .124, F(2, 116)= 19.803 p  = .000, Pp̂  = .255, and F (l, 116) = 11.079p  = .002, Pp̂  = 
.160, respectively. Participants made five percent errors on false problems with small 
splits compared with only one percent errors for false problems with medium or large 
splits. Once again, this illustrates that it is more difficult for participants to judge 
problems with small splits as incorrect than to judge problems with large splits as 
incorrect. Errors made on large false problems were similar to errors made for large true 
problems and were one percent higher than the error rate for small false problems. The 
signifieant main effect of repeat was not unexpected; however, prior to conducting the 
experiment, it was thought that more errors would be made on no-repeat problems. 
Exactly the opposite effect was found; the percentage of errors made for repeated 
problems was twice that of unique problems for high math anxious partieipants, F(1, 58)
= 11.079 p  = .002, tjp̂  = . 160.
Along with the main effects mentioned above, all two and three-way interaction 
combinations of split, repeat, and problem size were significant. The trend for each 
followed the same patterns as the main effects with more errors being made on large, 
repeated problems with small splits. The three-way interaction is displayed in figures 7 
and 8, F(3, 116) = 7.356p  = .001, = .113.
Another significant three-way interaction was found that included math anxiety. 
Shown in figures 9 and 10 is the significant split x repeat x math anxiety interaction F(3, 
116) = 2.945 p  = .023, Pp̂  = .092. For the unique problems, all three math anxiety groups
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performed similarly in terms of error percentages, ranging from zero to four percent, with 
the four percent error rate being found for high math anxious individuals verifying unique 
problems with small splits. The much more interesting finding comes from looking at the 
repeated problems. Again, for the medium and high splits, the math anxiety groups 
pretty much cluster together with respect to percent errors; however, error rates jump 
dramatically among the groups when it comes to repeated problems with small splits.
The low math anxious group made four percent errors, the medium math anxious group 
made twelve percent errors (three times that of the low math anxious group), and the high 
math anxious group made seven percent errors. The medium and high math anxious 
individuals really seemed to be Second-guessing themselves after seeing a false problem 
with a small split several times.
The above results provide the opportunity for some investigative applications of previous 
theories. For example, the results may be due to a familiarity effect (Atkinson & Juola, 
1973) for simple addition problems that changes for high math anxious individuals. The 
more times the problem is shown, the more familiar the false answer becomes. As a 
result, high math anxious participants become less sure that they are verifying correctly, 
and therefore are likely to make errors. This explanation will be considered in greater 
detail in the discussion section.
Operation Span (OSPAN): Reaction Times and Error Rates 
The OSPAN was given to participants to measure their working memory capacities. 
Participants were separated into high and low span by performing a median split on 
participants’ raw scores obtained by the OSPAN. The distribution of high and low span
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participants among the math anxiety groups can he seen in tahle 1. To he thorough, a 
Chi-square test was performed to make sure the percentages of high and low span 
partieipants were not significantly different among the math anxiety 
groups, = 64) = 1.110,/? = .574. To investigate any effects o f working memory
span on the data, span group was inserted as a between subjeets variable into the repeated 
measures ANOVA to examine reaction times and error rates. Even though true and false 
problems were analyzed, false problems were o f special interest, since recall results 
consisting of only false problems were used to measure stimulus learning in the eurrent 
study.
Reaction Times (true and false problems)
Reaction time analysis for true problems showed two signifieant three-way interactions 
involving working memory span. The first was a repeat x span group x math anxiety 
group interaction, F(2, 58) = 3.422p  = .039. Shown in figures 11 & 12, reaction times 
were pretty stable across repeat condition except for in the high span group, figure 12, 
where the medium and high math anxious partieipants switched places from the repeated 
to the unique eondition. Overall, low math anxious participants took less time to verify 
answers to true problems regardless of span group; however, low math anxious 
partieipants with low working memory spans took an average o f around 250 ms longer to 
verify than low math anxious partieipants with high working memory spans. This seems 
to indicate a general slowing down of reaction times due solely to working memory span 
differences; low working memory span may result in being more easily distracted from 
the task (mind wandering from the task at hand resulting in longer reaction times). Also 
significant, displayed in figures 13 & 14, was the block x problem size x span group
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interaction F(2, 116) = 3.526p  = .033. This result was not surprising: reaction times to 
true problems were longer for large problems (problem-size effect), longer for low span 
participants, and shorter across blocks (practice effect). No Significant results were 
obtained regarding working memory span and reaction times to false problems.
Error Rates (true and false problems)
Error rate analysis for true problems resulted in one main effect approaching significance, 
span group F (l, 58) = 3.766p  -  .057, figure 15, and one significant interaction, repeat x 
span group F (l, 58) = 5.672p  =.021, figure 16. Even though these effects were 
significant, the error rates were very small. For example, the low span participants had a 
3% error rate while the high span participants had a 1% error rate, see figure 15. For true 
problems, high span participants still made more errors on repeated trials. Low span 
participants made more errors on unique trials, which is opposite of the general trend for 
error rates mentioned above; however, the difference in error rates from repeated to 
unique trials was not even 2%. Several significant results were also obtained when 
working memory span and error rates to false problems were studied. Low span 
participants made more than twice as many errors, 5% compared to 2% for high span 
participants, on false problems, especially large problems. Figure 17 displays the 
significant problem size x span group interaction, F(l, 58) = 4.520p  = .038, r\p = .072. 
Seyler, Kirk, and Ashcraft (2003) found a similar interaction effect with regard to 
subtraction problems. In their subtraction only condition; low span participants were 
found to have made 12.5% and 16.2% errors on small and large problems, respectively. 
According to the results of the current study, that pattern continues across simple addition
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problems as well, giving further evidence to the idea that large problems depend more 
heavily on working memory resources.
Furthermore, when split was taken into consideration, a significant split x problem 
size X span group interaction was found, F (2 ,116) = 4.534 /? = .013, = .072), such that
low span participants, compared to high span participants, made more errors on large 
problems with small splits, 12% and 6%, respectively. This interaction effect was 
consistent with literature regarding the split effect; the closer the split answer is to the 
true answer, the harder it is for participants to verify the problem as false, an effect that is 
especially true for low span participants. Less than 2% errors were made by either high 
or low span participants on false problems having medium or large splits, see figures 18 
& 19.
High span participants made fewer errors on false problems regardless of math 
anxiety group; however, low span participants, especially those with medium and high 
math anxiety, made significantly more errors, 12% and 6%, respectively, than those low 
span participants with low math anxiety, 2%, figure 18. The three-way interaction of 
split X math anxiety x span group, figures 20 & 21, was highly significant, F(4, 116) = 
3.805 p  = .006, T|p̂  = . 116. This result lends further support to the theory that math 
anxiety takes up valuable working memory resources needed to correctly complete a 
math task (Ashcraft & Faust, 1994; Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001).
Consistent with error rate results above for false problems, more errors were made on 
false problems that repeated than false problems that were unique, especially for those 
participants who were higher in math anxiety and classified as low span. Significant 
results were found for the following two- and three-way interactions: repeat x span group
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F(l, 58) = 6.873 p  = .011, rip̂  = .106 and repeat x math anxiety group x span group F(2, 
58) = 5.360p  = .007, Pp  ̂= .156. The highest error percentage, 9%, was made by those 
individuals who were low span and had a medium level of math anxiety. Figures 22 &
23 illustrate this result nicely.
Other significant interaction effects found for false problems and error rates that 
further illustrate the above points included the following:, split x repeat x span group F(2, 
116) = 3.069p  = .05, Pp̂  = .050, block x split x math anxiety group x span group F(8, 
232) = 2.033 p  = .044, pp  ̂= .065, split x problem size x math anxiety group x span group 
F(4, 116) = 3.415/7 = .011, Pp̂  = .105, split x repeat x math anxiety group x span group 
F(4, 116) = 5.104/? = .001, Pp̂  = .150, and problem size x repeat x math anxiety group x 
span group F(2, 58) = 4.563 p  = .014, pp  ̂= .136. In general, these results are indicative 
of the problem size and split effects. More errors were typically made when verifying 
large problems and problems with small splits. Also, with exception to true stimuli, 
which were not as highly considered as the false stimuli due to the nature of the 
experiment and the forced recall task, more errors were made when verifying repeated 
stimuli than unique stimuli. This particular pattern provides for some interesting 
theoretical implications that will be examined in the discussion section. All o f the above 
significant interactions illustrated that low span individuals spent more time on and made 
more errors when verifying answers to simple addition stimuli. The results also indicate 
a tendency for math anxiety to have more of an effect on low working memory span 
individuals than high working memory span individuals. A possible theoretical 
connection between math anxiety and working memory span will also be examined in the 
discussion section.
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Forced Recall Task
Learning, as measured by recall accuracy, was examined using a 3 x 3 x 2 x 2 x 2  mixed 
model ANOVA examining the factors of split, math anxiety, problem size, repeat, and 
learning condition respectively. There were significant main effects of split F(2, 116) = 
47.205 p = .000, pp  ̂= .449 and repeat F (l, 59) = 83.398 p = .000, pp  ̂= .590. There was 
also a signifieant split by repeat interaction, F(2, 116) = 28.461, p = .000, Pp  ̂= .329. As 
shown in figure 24 (split x repeat), significant recall differences were found for repeated 
problems with either low or medium size splits; however, whether the problem was 
repeated or not, recall efforts were poor for problems with large splits. Note that this is 
not a simple function of how long the problems were processed during the verification 
phase of the experiment. Small split problems took longer to reject, to be sure, and 
therefore might be expected to be recalled better, and likewise, large split problems took 
less time to reject, hence might be expected to be recalled more poorly. But medium split 
problems were also rejected fairly rapidly (Figure 6), yet were recalled nearly as well as 
small split answers; at least that was the ease for high and medium math anxious 
partieipants. The resolution of this paradox is found in Figures 25 & 26, depicting the 
significant interaction of repeat x split x math anxiety.
Although there was no main effect for math anxiety F (l, 58) = 2.136 p = .127, there 
was a signifieant repeat x split x math anxiety interaction F(4, 116) = 3.298 p = .013,
= .102. The interaction can be seen in figures 25 & 26, with figure 25 displaying the 
problems that did repeat and figure 26 displaying the problems that did not repeat. As 
shown in figure 26, unique problems showed little difference among math anxiety groups 
with regard to recall accuracy, except for the general trend of recalling more answers
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with small splits than with medium or large splits. However, for the repeated problems, 
there were differences among the math anxiety groups and their recall of false answers 
such that low math anxious participants recalled less than the high math anxious 
participants for repeated problems with small splits. Also, for repeated problems with 
medium splits, the low math anxious group recalled less than both the medium and the 
high math anxious groups. This finding could possibly be the result of the low math 
anxious participants spending less time looking at the problems. It may have been easier 
for the low math anxious group to reject a problem as false, whereas a medium or high 
math anxious participant might have spent longer looking at the problem, figuring out 
what the answer was, deciding if the answer provided with the problem matched and then 
possibly even double checking to make sure.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Hypotheses
The first hypothesis of the current study involved the demographic information. It 
was expected that high math anxious participants would have taken fewer high school 
and college math courses and received lower grades in the math classes that they had 
taken. Analyses did not indicate any significant differences among the math anxiety 
groups and how many math classes they had taken in high school or college or the 
average grades received in high school math courses. This simply could have been a 
result of having too small a sample size. Another possibility that might be specific to the 
school district in which the study took place, is that local high school requirements and 
grading standards may be more lenient in terms o f achieving grades. It may have also 
been helpful to collect data concerning specific college major requirements for how many 
math courses individual participants needed for graduation. The demographic sheet used 
in the current study did not include a place for participants to indicate their current 
college majors. Significant differences were found, however, with regard to the average 
grades received in participants’ college math courses. As mentioned in the results 
section, low math anxious participants did report earning significantly higher grades in 
their college math courses than high
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math anxious participants. What could account for there being no significant differences 
among math anxiety groups and high school math grades, but then there being a 
significant difference with regard to their college math grades? It is certainly a 
possibility that high math anxious students may not be ready, in general, for the demands 
of college math courses, especially if the standards for high school grading were not as 
stringent; in fact, the high math anxiety may even interfere with their ability to adapt to 
learning new math tasks which are possibly being taught at a faster and more demanding 
rate than before. On the other hand low math anxious students may have a greater ability 
to adapt to increasing standards because they would have little, if any, anxiety about the 
new math tasks at hand.
A second hypothesis of the current study was that participants in the intentional 
learning condition would have higher recall accuracy than those participants in the 
incidental learning condition, and that this result would occur regardless o f math anxiety. 
This hypothesis was not confirmed. Even though participants in the intentional learning 
condition spent significantly longer looking at the simple addition stimuli (refer back to 
figures 1 & 2), learning condition was not found to have any significant effects on recall 
accuracy. However, math anxiety was found to be a significant factor affecting recall 
accuracy, but not in the way that the current study would have predicted prior to running 
participants. These results will be discussed in detail in the next section along with 
results concerning the final hypothesis of the experiment, which posited that participants 
with high math anxiety and high working memory capacity would still be less accurate on 
the recall task than the low math anxious participants with either high or low working 
memory capacities.
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Added Findings and Possible Explanations 
Two unexpected findings occurred during this experiment in that the high math anxious 
participants both made more errors on repeated problems and yet correctly recalled more 
false answers with both small and medium splits than did low math anxious participants. 
In order to make sense o f these results, it may be possible to apply an established model 
for recognition, with a few minor changes. In a 1973 chapter, Atkinson and Juola refer to 
a specific model of recognition for well-learned lists of words. According to the model, 
as soon as participants see the test stimulus, they do one of two things: they can make a 
judgment based on their already existing familiarity value for the word, or they can delay 
their response until after an extensive memory search has been made.
The model predicts a “fast yes” or a “fast no” response if the participant’s familiarity 
value exceeds or is below certain thresholds; however, if  the familiarity value is in 
between those two thresholds, then an extensive search of memory takes place, and the 
latencies get longer as a result (Atkinson & Juola, 1973). This model can readily be 
applied to the simple addition verification task used in this experiment. For college 
students, simple addition facts could be likened to a well-learned list where the answers 
are already in long term memory and are pulled out using a network retrieval model 
(Ashcraft & Battaglia, 1978). Applying the Atkinson and Juola model, if  the test 
stimulus presented was a true problem, the participant’s familiarity value would have 
been expected to be very high, resulting in a “fast yes” response. On the other hand, if 
the test stimulus presented was a false problem, the participant’s familiarity value would 
be very low, resulting in a “fast no” response. The second part o f the model did not hold 
true for participants with varying levels o f math anxiety. Although both high and low
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math anxious participants were faster overall for repeated problems than for unique 
problems, the high math anxious participants were much slower than the low math 
anxious participants to verify both repeated and unique false problems across all levels of 
split. It is possible that the familiarity value of high math anxious participants for false 
problems started to fall in between the two thresholds as the problem repeated, resulting 
in a more extensive memory search to double check the answer. In other words, the high 
math anxious participants possibly began to second guess themselves as the false problem 
repeated i.e. the false problem actually developed its own familiarity value with repeated 
viewings, but only for high math anxious participants who may have not been as 
confident in their retrieved answer in the first place. This could explain the higher error 
rate exhibited by high math anxious participants for false repeated problems; as the 
familiarity value increased, high math anxious individuals were more likely to verify the 
false problem as true. Also, since high math anxious participants spent more time overall 
looking at repeated problems at all levels of split, it was more likely that the false answer 
paired with a particular problem would be encoded into short term memory and 
remembered during the recall task, especially for small and medium splits.
These results also lend further support to the network-interference model of retrieval 
(Campbell, 1987a; Campbell, 1987b). Assumptions of this model are that arithmetic 
problems access a shared network of possible answers, and that related problems activate 
overlapping areas o f the network. According to the model, an encoded problem has a set 
of potential responses activated in memory, and the speed and probability o f retrieval is a 
function o f activation level of the correct answer, relative to competing answers in the 
overlapping area (Campbell, 1990). Results from the current experiment supporting this
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model were that all partieipants, regardless o f math anxiety level, were slower and made 
more errors on false problems with small splits; these results illustrate that answers that 
are elose to the eorreet answer overlap with the correct answer in the network, and that 
both speed and accuracy depend on the activation level of the correct answer relative to 
other answers in the network.
It is possible to tie in the network-interferenee model with the above idea of high math 
anxious individuals developing an increased familiarity value for repeated false 
problems. Results for the current experiment pointed to an increasing familiarity value 
for repeated false problems, especially for high math anxious partieipants. Drawing from 
the network-interferenee model, it can also be concluded that the false answer was 
gaining a higher level of activation with each repetition. As the false problems repeated 
throughout the experiment, assume that both the familiarity level and the level of 
activation became higher for the presented false answer than for the true answer. The 
previously presented false answer was not only more familiar, but also was activated 
first, interfering with the activation level of and the ability to retrieve the true answer. 
Therefore a greater likelihood was that partieipants, especially those with higher levels of 
math anxiety, would answer true instead of false to the repeated false problems. On the 
other hand, the results suggest that low math anxious individuals have such a high level 
of activation for the true answer already, possibly resulting from a combination of more 
practice, more confidence, and less anxiety, that, even with increased activation and 
familiarity for the answers to repeated false problems, it was still easier for them to reject 
the answer presented and correctly verify the problem as false.
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The working memory data collected from the current study also produced results 
worth discussing. Recall from above, that the final hypothesis of the current experiment 
was that high math anxious participants with high working memory spans would be less 
accurate on the verification task than low math anxious participants. This hypothesis was 
derived from previous evidence that math anxiety interferes with working memory 
resources needed to complete a math task (Ashcraft & Kirk, 2001). Results from the 
current experiment did not confirm this hypothesis, although one reason for this could 
have been the stimuli used for the study. College students, who can be expected to be 
heavily practiced on simple addition problems, are unlikely to make many verification 
errors on simple addition stimuli. Significant error rate results in Ashcraft and Kirk 
(2001) were found for large problems involving a carrying operation. Results from the 
current experiment might have been consistent with Ashcraft and Kirk (2002) had the 
stimuli been more challenging for the participants. Even though the hypothesis was 
unconfirmed, there were other working memory span results o f interest. In particular, 
low span participants with higher levels of math anxiety made more errors on repeated 
false problems with small splits, see figures 14 and 15. Familiarity effects have already 
been discussed with regard to higher levels of math anxiety, but it is also possible that 
having a low working memory span, i.e. not being able to sufficiently hold and process a 
lot of information at once, creates susceptibility to developing an increased familiarity to 
repeated problems. As mentioned above, this increased familiarity effect could account 
for participants, especially those with low working memory spans and high math anxiety, 
more likely verifying a false problems as true the more times that they see it.
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General Conclusions
In the past, it has been shown that math anxiety interferes not only with performing 
math tasks (Asheraft & Faust, 1994; Asheraft & Kirk, 1998; Faust, Asheraft, & Fleek, 
1996), but also with working memory resourees (Asheraft & Kirk, 2001; Hopko, 
Asheraft, & Gute, 1998). The current study examined both math anxiety and working 
memory eapaeity in the eontext of stimulus learning. High math anxious participants 
were found to be able to learn more o f the stimuli; however, this was not due to 
efficiency in verification. Results indicated that higher stimulus learning rates from high 
math anxious partieipants were more likely due to more time spent looking at the 
problems before verifieation. It has been theorized above that high math anxious 
partieipants may have more interferenee and aetivation for several answers surrounding 
the correct answer. This was indicated in results showing high math anxious partieipants 
making more verifieation errors, espeeially to repeated problems, but still being able to 
eorreetly reeall signifieantly more false answers eorreetly, espeeially for false problems 
with small splits, where the false answer was only one or two away from the true answer. 
Higher stimulus learning rates in the eurrent study aetually indieated that high math 
anxious individuals may have a less effieient network retrieval model eonsisting o f more 
interferenee along with a suseeptibility to develop an inereased familiarity rate to 
repeated false stimuli.
In general, it seems that high math anxious individuals with low working memory 
spans are more suseeptible to making errors. In the ease o f the eurrent experiment, 
higher reeall meant more acceptanee of wrong answers, whieh possibly broadened the 
overlapping network areas, ereating more interferenee. It may be possible that having
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low working memory span could create a long-term lowering of good number sense by 
allowing the network to create higher familiarity values for wrong answers. Once the 
familiarity is increased, more network interferenee would be created. This would result 
in more errors being made as low span individuals, especially those with higher levels of 
math anxiety, tried to retrieve answers to simple addition stimuli.
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APPENDIX 
TABLES AND FIGURES
Table 1
The means and standard deviations of the findings from the baekground information 
sheet.
Math Anxiety G roups fSD in P aren theses)
DemoaraDhic Variable Low (n = 19) Medium (n = 23) High (n = 22)
Low Span n= 9 n = 10 n = 13
High Span n = 10 n = 13 n = 9
Gender (M/F) 11/8 8/15 7/15
Sig.
ns
Age 23.42(11.38) 19.04(1.33) 20.68(3.05) ns
Class Year 2.42(1.305) 1.7(1.06) 2.23(1.23) ns
Number of M.S. math courses taken 4.22(1.215) 3.65(.573) 3.70(.70) ns
M.S. math grade 3.39(.698) 3.09(.66) 2.91(.75) ns
Number of college math courses taken 1.26(1.19) 1.00(1.08) 1.45(1.01) ns
College math grade 3.25(.75) 3.11 (.92) 2.38(.76) p < .05
Rated math anxiety 4.21(2.72) 4.83(1.89) 6.68(1.78) p < .01
Rated math enjoyment 8.05(2.43) 4.91(2.13) 3.64(2.21) p < .01
sMARS score 17.95(6.03) 36.78(5.12) 57.23(8.93) p < .01
Ethnic Group % of total
African-American 10.5 8.7 27.3
ns
Hispanic/Latino 5.3 4.3 4.5
Native American 5.3 N/A N/A
Asian/Pacific Islander 31.6 47.8 22.7
Caucasuan 47.4 39.1 36.4
Other N/A N/A 9.1
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